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The Role of Temporary Agency Employment
in Tight Labor Markets

Abstract
This paper examines the reasons why employers used and even increased their use of temporary help
agencies during the tight labor markets of the 1990s. Based on case study evidence from the hospital
and auto supply industries, we evaluate various hypotheses for this phenomenon. In high-skilled
occupations, our results are consistent with the view that employers paid substantially more to agency
help to avoid raising wages for their regular workers and to fill vacancies while they recruited workers
for permanent positions. In low-skilled occupations, our evidence suggests that temporary help
agencies facilitated the use of more “risky” workers by lowering their wages and benefits and the costs
associated with turnover. The use of agency temporaries in both high- and low-skilled occupations
reduced the pressure on companies to raise wages for existing employees, and thereby may have
contributed to the stagnant wage growth and low unemployment observed in the 1990s.

Temporary agency employment expanded steadily during the 1990s. According to Bureau of
Labor Statistics establishment data, employment in help supply services, which primarily comprises
temporary help agencies, increased from 1.2 percent of paid employment in 1990 to 2.6 percent in
2000. The share in temporary agency employment grew throughout this period of strong economic
expansion and very low unemployment despite the fact that the majority of temporary agency workers
express a desire for regular, permanent jobs (Cohany 1998). The preference for regular employment
among most agency temporaries has led many to conclude that the growth of the share in temporary
employment in the 1990s was most likely driven by employer demand. In this paper, we provide
insights into why employers heavily rely on temporary agency workers in tight labor markets based on
evidence from two industries: hospitals and auto supply manufacturers.
The fact that the share in temporary agency employment moves procyclically has long been
observed. The most common explanation for this pattern is that companies use agency temporaries to
handle demand variability and to buffer core workers during downturns (Mangum, Mayall, and Nelson
1985; Abraham 1988; Kandel and Pearson 2001). Because agency temporaries are the first to be laid
off in a recession, we would expect the share in temporary employment to rise during expansions and
fall during recessions.
Nevertheless, it is hard to understand why, in the aggregate, the share in temporary employment
would continue to grow strongly after almost a decade of expansion if firms were simply using
temporaries to buffer core workers against an anticipated downturn. Indeed, evidence from employer
surveys, (Abraham 1988, 1990; Houseman 2001b) suggests the importance of other factors, including
difficulty in finding qualified workers on their own and the desire to screen workers for permanent
positions. The hypothesis that, in tight labor markets, companies are filling vacancies with temporary

agency workers while they recruit employees and are sometimes recruiting employees from the ranks of
agency temporaries is strongly supported by our case study evidence.
One theme developed in this paper is that the use of agency temporaries in tight labor markets
relieved pressure on companies to raise wages of regular employees. During the 1990s, the U.S.
economy experienced low wage growth coupled with low unemployment rates.1 Although temporary
agency employment still accounts for a relatively small share of paid employment, the growth in
temporary employment accounted for 10 percent of net employment growth in the economy during the
1990s. If workers face costs in switching employers and internal labor market rules characterize wage
setting for workers with some tenure on the job, then market forces primarily influence wage levels by
affecting the wages of new entrants.2 Thus, it is reasonable to hypothesize some connection between
the rapid growth in temporary agency employment, slow aggregate wage growth, and low
unemployment. Indeed, Katz and Krueger (1999) present evidence that states with a greater presence
of temporary agency employment experienced lower wage growth in the 1990s and that the lower
wage growth associated with the growth in temporary employment may have accounted for up to a
0.4-percentage-point reduction in the unemployment rate. A major contribution of this paper is to
improve our understanding of the mechanisms by which temporary agency use may lead to lower
overall wage growth.

1

See Katz and Krueger (1999) for a documentation of this phenomenon and some hypotheses about its

causes.
2

See, for example, discussions on wage setting processes in internal labor markets in Doeringer and Piore
1971 and Levine, et al. 2002, Chapter 2.
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WHY EMPLOYERS USE AGENCY TEMPORARIES IN TIGHT LABOR MARKETS: A
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
We begin by providing a conceptual framework for organizing and interpreting the case study
information presented in subsequent sections. We assume that employers use agency temporaries in
lieu of other factor inputs, such as direct-hire temporaries or regular employees, to reduce costs. Such
cost savings can occur through a variety of mechanisms and we offer several potential explanations for
why companies used and, on average, increased their use of temporary agency workers in the very tight
labor markets characterizing the U.S. economy in the 1990s.
One potential explanation is that companies often find it cost-effective to hire workers on
explicitly temporary contract when the work is expected to be temporary or is of uncertain duration and
companies have more such work when the economy is booming than when it is in recession.
Theoretically, there must be some difference between temporary and regular workers to explain
employers’ use of explicitly temporary contracts. To generate greater employer demand for temporary
workers when an increase in workload is temporary or of uncertain duration, previous theoretical
models (Abraham 1988, Kandel and Pearson 2001) have assumed that workers on temporary contract
are less productive than regular workers but less costly to terminate.3 The amount of temporary work
may increase during an expansion, as companies take on special projects that are intrinsically shortterm in nature. Moreover, during an expansion employers are more likely to experience an increase in
3

These termination costs can take various forms. U.S. employees have some rights to advance notice in
the event of a mass layoff, and many state courts have granted workers legal protection against unjust dismissal in
specific circumstances (Autor 2003). Moreover, companies may adopt personnel policies providing implied
commitments of job security to regular employees in order to reduce turnover and build firm-specific human capital
among a core set of workers. Independent of any legal restrictions, breaking these implied commitments may have
costs, including lower morale and productivity and higher turnover. The assumption that regular employees are
more productive–or have some other cost advantage–is needed to generate an economy with both regular and
temporary workers.
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their workload that, at least with some probability, is perceived as temporary. For instance, as
employment increases during an expansionary period, employers may increase their relative use of
temporary workers to buffer core workers, who are more expensive to lay off, against a possible
downturn. This first explanation for why companies are more likely to use temporary workers when the
economy is booming is akin to a scale effect: the greater quantity of temporary work will result in
greater employer demand for all temporary workers: agency temporaries as well as temporary workers
hired directly by companies.4
A second explanation is related to the fact that many companies use temporary agency workers
to fill vacancies until permanent hires are made, in some cases, recruiting permanent workers from the
ranks of the agency temporaries. The empirical importance of using agency temporaries to fill
vacancies and to screen workers for permanent positions has been well established in recent surveys
(Abraham 1990, Houseman 2001b, Kalleberg, Reynolds, and Marsden, 2003). Because agency
temporaries are used for new hires and the accession rate moves procyclically, the share in temporary
agency employment would also move procyclically. It is interesting to note that under this scenarios, the
share in temporary employment would increase during an expansion even if the nature of the increased
workload is not temporary.
Finally, companies may substitute agency temporaries for direct-hire temporaries or for directhire recruits during expansions if the cost of agency temporaries relative to that of direct-hire
temporaries or recruits declines when labor markets tighten. Here, the share in temporary employment
4

Abraham (1988) and Kandel and Pearson (2001) distinguish between temporary and permanent or regular
workers, but not between types of temporary workers. The distinction between workers hired through third
parties–like temporary agencies–and direct-hire temporaries is a critical component of the theory and empirical
evidence presented below.
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would grow during an expansion not only because the accession rate was increasing but also because
the share of new hires who were agency temporaries was increasing.
Regarding the last two explanations, there are various reasons why temporary agencies may
enjoy a cost advantage in the recruitment and screening of temporary and permanent workers and why
their cost advantage may increase when labor markets tighten. When labor markets are slack, it is
relatively easy for companies to form in-house, on-call worker pools or to hire temporaries directly.
When labor markets tighten, the supply of workers willing to accept temporary work or unpredictable
hours shrinks at any given wage. Because temporary agencies pool jobs across companies, they can
offer workers more steady employment, or for those who desire temporary work, agencies are better
able to offer them employment when they want to work. Similarly, temporary agencies likely enjoy
scale economies in recruiting and screening workers for permanent positions, especially in tight labor
markets when companies have fewer unsolicited, qualified job applicants and receive fewer qualified
applicants for any recruiting expenditure.
In addition, we argue that the use of temporary agency workers to fill temporary positions or to
fill vacancies while companies recruit permanent workers is often advantageous to companies because
they may discriminate between temporary agency and direct-hire workers in the compensation offered.
However, the direction of the wage discrimination along with the precise mechanisms by which
temporary agencies are able to recruit workers and companies are able to save on compensation costs
will depend on the labor market.5 We outline two scenarios below.

5

We use the term “wage discrimination” to denote the payment of unequal wages or compensation to
agency temporary and permanent workers who are assigned to the same job.

5

•

Agency temporaries receive higher wages than direct-hire employees.
Suppose, for now, that the workers an employer hires for a particular position are

homogeneous in quality. The market wage rate, w, facing individual employers depends upon the
degree of labor market tightness, proxied by the unemployment rate, µ,

δw
< 0.
δµ

We assume that an employer’s existing workforce faces some costs in switching jobs.6 Therefore,
across some range, a decline in the unemployment rate will not force an employer to raise wages to
prevent existing workers from quitting to take new jobs. Similarly, we assume that wage cuts cause
serious morale and productivity problems and consequently an employer will not lower wages for
existing employees when unemployment increases, at least across some range. With the standard
assumption that workers within the firm receive the same wage (i.e., no wage discrimination), the
marginal cost of a new hire at time t is simply the wage paid to existing workers when the
unemployment rate has been stable or rising since the last hire. However, if a firm wishes to hire
additional labor, L, and labor markets have tightened since it last hired, the marginal cost is the higher

 δw   δµ 
 Lt ,
wt +   
 δµ   δt 

(1)

δµ
< 0.
δt

wage it must offer the new worker, plus the pay raise it must offer existing workers:
A cost-minimizing employer would prefer to wage-discriminate, offering higher wages only to
new workers. With wage discrimination, the marginal cost of hiring additional labor is simply the wage
6

These adjustment costs could include information costs in finding out changes in wage rates or
preferences for the status quo. In models with heterogeneous labor, they could include firm-specific human capital
for which the worker receives some additional compensation.
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of the new hire. It is generally assumed that employers do not practice wage discrimination, even if
existing workers face high costs of switching jobs, because such a two-tiered wage system would be
seen as unfair by workers and result in serious morale and productivity problems. However, we argue
any adverse morale and productivity effects are likely mitigated when new workers, who make more
money than existing workers, are hired through a third party, such as a temporary help agency. These
adverse morale and productivity effects might be lower if regular employees are less knowledgeable
about temporary agency workers’ wage levels than they are about other employees’ wage levels. It
may be more costly for employees to gain information about wage levels in other companies–in this
case temporary agencies–than in their own company, particularly if the referring agency is not local.
Additionally, employees may have fewer social contacts with agency workers than with other
employees, and hence opportunities to exchange wage information, particularly if agency workers are
on short-term assignment. Alternatively, because the client company does not directly set the wages of
the temporary workers, employees may not fully blame their employers for the wage differentials.
Formally, suppose that the cost of hiring an additional worker and paying her more than existing
workers is K if the worker is hired directly, but only k, k < K, if the worker is hired through a third
party. Then, if the firm chooses to practice wage discrimination, it will only do so through a third party,
like a temporary agency, and it will only practice wage discrimination in new hiring if the additional

 δw   δµ 
   L , exceed the marginal cost of wage discrimination, k.
 δµ   δt 

payments to existing workers, 

7

Thus, when unemployment is falling, and hence wages of new hires are rising, some employers may
choose to practice wage discrimination through a temporary agency. 7
The use of temporary agency workers may also make it possible for employers to discriminate
in the composition of the compensation package offered in ways that would be illegal or impractical if
all workers were employees. For instance, nondiscrimination clauses in the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Internal Revenue Service tax code make it difficult for
employers to offer different benefits packages to different groups of full-time employees.8 Temporary
help agencies, which typically offer much lower benefits levels than client firms, likely attract some
workers who place a low value on company-provided benefits. For instance, workers with health
insurance coverage from another family member may place little or no value on health insurance benefits
offered by their employer. Therefore, if the cash component of compensation in temporary jobs is
higher than the cash component in regular jobs, it is possible that temporary agency workers place a
higher value on the compensation from the temporary agency than the compensation they would earn in
a regular employment position, even if the total cost of providing that compensation package is the
same or less. In these cases, the use of temporary help agencies allows efficient sorting of workers by
compensation preference and potentially benefits workers and employers alike.
Thus far, the choice between regular and temporary workers has been posed as a one-time
decision by employers seeking to increase their workforces. One might more realistically think of the
7

Bellemore (1998) develops a similar model of wage discrimination to study wage differentials between
agency and regular nurses. Our model differs from his in that it does not require that employers have monopsony
power in labor markets; rather, in our model, employers face rising wages over time if labor markets tighten.
8

ERISA and non-discrimination clauses in the IRS tax code are designed to ensure that highly compensated
individuals are not the primary beneficiaries of fringe benefits that constitute in-kind, tax-free or tax-deferred income.
See Houseman (2001a) for further discussion of these rules.
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process as a dynamic one in which firms temporarily use higher-priced temporary labor in order to buy
additional time to fill permanent vacancies. Specifically, in a model in which workers have imperfect
information about the distribution of potential wage offers, a firm’s probability of filling a vacancy at any
point in time would vary positively with the wage package and the unemployment rate.9 Employers
may quickly recruit high-priced temporary agency labor to fill vacancies, buying time to recruit
permanent workers at lower wages.10 Whether or not employers choose to utilize temporary agency
workers for this purpose will depend on the price of temporary relative to permanent workers, the time
it would take to recruit regular workers at lower wages, and the cost of leaving vacancies unfilled. In
this dynamic context, the essential theoretical insight is the same as in the static model discussed above:
it may be advantageous for employers to hire temporary workers in tight labor markets because they
can discriminate in the wages they offer temporary and permanent workers and thereby avoid raising
wages for existing workers.
•

Agency temporaries may receive lower wages than direct-hire employees.
Consider now a labor market in which there are two types of workers: L1 are “good” workers,

who have good work histories and are certain to work out; L2 are “risky” workers who have poor or
no work histories, but, with probability ρ , will prove to be “good” workers, 0 < ρ < 1. Wage levels
for good workers are greater than or equal to those of risky workers, w1 > w2. Risky workers who

9

The assumption that vacancies and thus employment levels are a function of the wage rate has been used
in a number of theoretical models. For a review of these models, see Card and Krueger (1995).
10

Note that even if temporary workers are paid more, some workers may still prefer permanent positions.
This is because temporary and permanent positions are not identical–the latter is associated with more job security
and possibly more benefits. Thus, for some workers, the non-compensation aspects of a permanent job outweigh
the lower compensation, or their personal valuation of the total compensation package may be higher for the
permanent job.

9

prove themselves to be good workers receive w1 after a probationary period. Risky workers who
prove to be “bad” workers quit or are fired, with a cost f to the employer; f captures any direct costs
of dismissal as well as recruitment and screening costs associated with turnover. Expected output is
assumed to be a simple linear function of the two potential labor inputs: E [Q ] = L1 + ρL2
When hiring, cost-minimizing employers will select a good or a risky worker depending upon
the cost per unit of output for each type.

(2)

 w2 t + (1 − ρ ) f 
w1t > 
,
<
ρ

(3)

 w2t + (1 − ρ ) f 
 δw   δµ 
w1t +  1    L1t > 
,
<
δµ
δ
t
ρ

 

δµ
≥0
δt

δµ
<0
δt

When the unemployment rate has been stable or growing, the marginal cost of hiring a good worker is
just the wage paid to that worker. With f and ρ varying across firms, some employers may choose to
hire risky workers during periods when the unemployment rate has been rising and labor markets are
slack. When the unemployment rate has been falling, employers must raise wages to hire a good
worker and so must also raise wages for existing employees, L1. Consequently, for any given wage
gap between good and risky workers, it is more attractive for employers to hire risky workers when
labor markets have been tightening.11
11

In this model, employers will find it more attractive to hire risky workers as labor markets tighten, unless
the wage gap between risky and good workers narrows so much that it negates savings realized from the lower
wages paid to existing workers. Although we do not discuss how w1 and w2 are set, we argue the wage gap, if
anything, is likely to expand as labor markets tighten. In slack labor markets, there is involuntary unemployment

10

Temporary help agencies potentially reduce the costs to employers of hiring risky workers in
several ways. First, temporary agencies will raise ρ the probability that a risky worker will work out
on a particular job, if they are more efficient in matching workers to jobs. Second, hiring a risky worker
through a temporary agency may lower f, the cost of a quit or dismissal. By lowering recruitment costs,
temporary agencies lower the costs of replacing workers and hence of using workers with low ρ .
Further, temporary workers, who are not employees of the client company, are probably less likely
than direct-hire employees to sue over a dismissal. In support of this notion, Autor (2003) finds a
strong empirical link between the decline of employment-at-will in state law and the growth of
temporary agency employment. Additionally, managers often find it difficult to dismiss a worker who
displays poor or mediocre performance. Arguably, managers are less likely to offer permanent
employment to a poor or mediocre temporary agency worker than they are to fire a similar direct-hire
employee. The benefit of using temporary agencies to screen workers for permanent positions, then, is
a more productive workforce.
Finally, a company may be unwilling to give more risky workers a chance at employment at its
existing entry-level wages. While in theory it could offer lower wages to new hires, offering new
entrants substantially lower wages than existing workers may cause morale and productivity problems
among new entrants. Moreover, the company may be legally unable to discriminate against new
workers in the benefits package it offers them. Above, we argued that a company may use temporary

among both labor types; w1 and w2 become more compressed in slack labor markets, perhaps because of minimum
wages or other social safety nets. Thus, employers are more likely to prefer good workers over risky workers in slack
conditions. Even in tight labor markets, low-skilled disadvantaged workers experience substantial
unemployment–again perhaps because of social safety nets–mitigating upward wage pressure on w2, and, we argue,
widening the gap between risky workers and good workers , at least in low-wage labor markets .
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agency workers in order to offer higher wages to new entrants. However, a company may also use
temporary agency workers to facilitate offering new entrants lower overall compensation.
In this model, the share in temporary employment will increase during expansions for two
reasons. First, companies use agencies to screen risky workers and the rate of new hires is procyclical. Second, the cost of hiring good workers relative to risky workers increases as labor markets
tighten, and so companies are more likely to choose to hire risky workers through temporary agencies
than hire good workers directly.
In this simple model, companies face perfectly elastic supply of good and risky workers when
making new hires, and choose to hire all of one type at any point in time. As discussed above,
however, when workers face search and information costs, an employer’s probability of filling a
vacancy at any point in time varies positively with the wage offered. Under this scenario, an employer
may follow a mixed strategy, hiring some good workers at relatively low wages directly, and filling
remaining vacancies with risky agency temporaries.
Implications for Wage Growth
The preceding discussion suggests several avenues by which temporary agencies may relieve
pressure on companies to raise wages in tight labor markets. Temporary help agencies may enjoy a
comparative advantage in recruiting and placing workers, especially in tight labor markets. Thus, the
substitution of agency temporaries for direct-hire temporaries and recruits may reduce pressure on
companies to raise wages by virtue of this better matching. If companies utilize agencies simply
because they have a comparative advantage in recruitment and screening, we would not expect to
observe any systematic differences in the wages of temporary and regular workers in the same job.
12

However, evidence that agency temporaries earn systematically higher or lower wages than
comparable regular workers would suggest wage discrimination and a different or additional mechanism
by which temporary agency use results in lower aggregate wage growth and unemployment. In some
cases, temporary help agencies may be able to recruit qualified candidates by paying them more than
companies pay regular workers. Here companies are effectively able to practice wage discrimination,
paying higher wages to new entrants than to longer tenure employees.12 Companies may also utilize
higher priced agency help to buy themselves time to recruit regular workers. This practice is most likely
to occur when the qualifications for a position are well-defined and easily observed or when the
potential costs to an employer of trying out a risky worker are great. We argue that this practice is
most likely to be associated with high-skilled labor markets, where workers must meet clear
educational or certification requirements to perform jobs and where the costs of having an unqualified
person staff a position are high.
In other cases, temporary help agencies may make the use of less qualified, more risky workers
acceptable to companies by lowering their wages or lowering the costs of firing and replacing them. In
this case, temporary help agencies effectively expand the supply of labor and mitigate the need for
companies to raise wages to attract more qualified applicants. This practice is most likely to occur when
applicants’ qualifications for a job are difficult to observe and where the costs of trying out risky
workers are low–or made low by the temporary agency. We argue that this practice is most likely to
be associated with low-skilled labor markets. In these markets, although most individuals are capable
12

The hypothesis that temporary agencies result in more efficient matching is the one primarily espoused in
Katz and Krueger (1999). However, they also raised the possibility that companies would wage discriminate in favor
of temporary agency workers.
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of performing the required tasks with minimal training, employers complain that many lack so-called
“soft skills”, such as honesty, punctuality, and the ability to get along with co-workers. These soft-skills
are difficult for employers to observe a priori, especially among applicants who lack a good work
history.
CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY
The evidence we present is based on extensive interviews conducted in six hospitals and five
auto suppliers in 1999 and 2000. We chose these two industries to represent a service and
manufacturing industry, respectively, that play prominent roles in the U.S. economy and that utilize large
numbers of workers in nonstandard arrangements, including agency temporaries.13 However, we had
little or no knowledge about a specific organization’s use of temporary agency workers prior to
selecting it for case study. Although we cannot claim that this small sample is fully representative of
organizations in the hospital and auto supply sectors, we sought to represent a variety of organizations
within each industry. Our hospitals came from two distinct geographical regions: three were in
Michigan and three were in North Carolina. The utilization of temporary agencies may be affected by
an organization’s size, for instance, with smaller organizations having a greater incentive to take
advantage of scale economies in recruiting that temporary agencies may offer. The hospitals in our
sample varied in size from a small Michigan hospital with 450 employees to a large North Carolina

13

We also studied a representative public sector industry, primary and secondary public schools. We do
not include public schools in this paper because relatively little use is made of agency temporaries in this industry.
Based on case studies in all three industries, we discuss the effects of a broader set of nonstandard work
arrangements on low-skilled workers in Erickcek, Houseman, and Kalleberg (forthcoming).
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hospital with 6,000 employees. An organization’s use of agency temporaries may also depend on the
presence of a union; one hospital in our sample was unionized.14
Although all of the auto suppliers represented in our case studies were from the Midwest, the
suppliers varied across other important dimensions: size, presence of a union, and ownership structure.
The auto supply establishments employed between 430 and 2,100 employees. Two of the plants were
unionized. Two were locally owned facilities, one was a branch plant of a larger U.S. company, and
two were subsidiaries of foreign-owned companies. Plants that are part of a larger corporation,
particularly a foreign-owned company, may have different personnel practices that affect temporary
agency use.
Within hospitals, we interviewed the human resources director and managers in key functional
areas: nursing, clerical and administrative support, laboratory, food services and housekeeping, and
clinical specialties (e.g., radiology, physical therapy). In two hospitals, we conducted focus groups of
permanent and temporary agency nurses. We also interviewed managers at several temporary agencies
that supplied nurses and medical assistants to the hospitals we studied.
In the auto supply companies, we focused exclusively on production workers, who account for
most of employment in these organizations. We interviewed the human resources director and
production managers in each plant. At one facility, we were able to conduct two focus groups with
workers: one with regular full-time production workers and the other with agency temporaries. We

14

Corporate structure could also impact incentives to minimize labor costs and utilize agency staff. None of
the hospitals in our sample were private for-profit. Three were public and three private, not-for-profit.
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also interviewed the on-site representative of the temporary agency at the three facilities having such a
representative.
We developed a structured set of questions for each type of interview conducted in the two
industries. This ensured that a core set of questions was asked in each case study. However, we
asked follow-up questions to interviewees’ responses to these core questions, which allowed us to
clarify their answers and gather more information about particularly interesting practices. We tape
recorded and transcribed all of our interviews.
Finally, we collected data from each participating organization on employment levels, hours
worked, wages, and benefits of employees for each occupation. Where available, we also collected
information on the extent of an organization’s use of temporary workers by occupation, the billed rate
paid to the temporary agency, and the actual wage paid to the temporary worker.15
HOSPITALS’ USE OF AGENCY TEMPORARIES IN TIGHT LABOR MARKETS
Pressures on hospitals to curb costs grew during the 1990s, due primarily to declining
reimbursement from the federal government and insurance companies and the growth of managed care
organizations. Against the backdrop of pressures to curb costs, hospitals faced especially tight labor
markets in nursing and other specialized clinical staff (Anderson and Wootton 1991; Buerhaus, Staiger,
and Auerbach 2000).
Table 1 presents quantitative information on temporary agency use by occupation for the five
hospitals maintaining such records. Hospitals used temporary agency workers for both high- and low-

15

A data appendix describing these data and the construction of variables reported in this paper is
available from the first author on request.
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skilled occupations. The extent to which agency temporaries were used for various occupations
differed across hospitals. Registered nurses represent the largest single occupation in a hospital, and
temporary agency RNs were used by all but one of the hospitals we studied. Although agency RNs
generally accounted for a relatively small share of total RN hours worked in each hospital (column 1,
Table 1), they accounted for a sizable share of the hospitals’ total temporary agency expenditures
(column 3, Table 1). Hospitals also used temporary agency workers in other high-skilled clinical
occupations, such as radiographers, cardiovascular technologists, respiratory therapists, and technicians
to operate CT, MRI, and ultrasound equipment.
In addition, hospitals used temporary help agencies to obtain workers for relatively low-skilled
clinical occupations such as nursing assistants and patient sitters. Workers in the latter occupation
watch extremely ill or confused patients and call for assistance, when necessary. In all of the hospitals
except M2, agency temporaries accounted for between 3 and 7 percent of total hours worked by these
low-skilled nursing and medical assistants.
Finally, hospitals used temporary agency workers in low-skilled support functions, particularly
clerical. Agency clerical workers in “unit administrative support” accounted for a sizable share (7 to 11
percent) of total hours worked in this occupation in three of the hospitals studied. Three hospitals
reported using agency temporaries in food services and housekeeping functions. Though data on
agency use in food services and housekeeping are available for just one hospital, figures for this hospital
suggest extensive reliance on agency temporaries to staff these positions.16
16

One hospital kept no central records of its use of temporary agencies and the other hospital kept no
central records of agency use in housekeeping and food services, perhaps because the management of these
functional areas was outsourced.
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Why Hospitals Use Temporary Agency Employees in High-Skilled Clinical Positions
Our interviews with managers revealed several situations in which they used agency temporaries
in nursing and non-nursing specialties. Variability in workload is one reason why hospitals used
temporary help agencies for more highly skilled occupations, such as nurses. Hospitals are required by
state codes to maintain minimum nurse/patient ratios, for example, yet hospital occupancy rates
fluctuate widely. Hence, using temporary help agencies enabled hospitals to add nurses as needed to
satisfy peaks in demand, and avoid overstaffing during other times. A second and related reason for
using temporary staffing was to cover for absences of regular employees, who were sick, on vacation,
or on extended leave.
A third reason for using temporary help agencies, cited by managers in all of the hospitals in our
study, was to temporarily fill a vacant position. Managers universally reported a shortage of nurses and
workers in some non-nursing specialties, which led to a large number of unfilled vacancies on their staff
and a greater demand for agency temporaries to fill these vacancies while they recruited permanent
staff. Some hospital managers reported that they explicitly recruited permanent staff from the pool of
agency temporaries, while others reported rarely doing so.
Interestingly, although we predicted a negative correlation between firm size and temporary
agency use owing to economies-of-scale enjoyed by the latter, the smallest hospital in our study (M2)
was the only one to not use agency help in high-skilled clinical positions. Like the other hospitals, it
reported difficulty in filling these positions, but could not get reliable service from agencies, whom, it
claimed, chose to focus on larger, higher-volume clients.
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Although the other five hospitals all used temporary agency personnel in high-skilled clinical
positions to handle an increase in workload, fill in for staff absences, or fill vacancies in permanent
positions, they all viewed the use of temporary agency workers in these situations as a measure of last
resort. They preferred to use in-house on-call staff or to fill vacancies with permanent workers.
Hospital managers essentially cited two reasons for preferring in-house staff over agency temporaries:
competency and cost. With respect to the first, most nurses and hospital administrators we interviewed
were happy with the quality of the temporary agency staff, especially with “traveler” nurses, who
typically work in highly specialized areas, such as critical care, and who are placed in hospitals around
the country by national level agencies for relatively long assignments (one to three months or more).
However, some hospital administrators complained about the uneven quality of nurses placed by local
agencies. Some also felt that agency nurses were less productive than regular staff nurses, but primarily
because of their lack of familiarity with the hospital’s organization.
Concern over the high cost of high-skilled temporary agency employees (such as nurses)
compared to in-house staff was echoed in our interviews with all of the hospitals. Hospital
administrators unanimously believed that the bill rate charged by temp agencies for nurses and nonnurse professionals exceeded the wage and nonwage labor costs associated with comparable in-house
staff. The information we were able to obtain on the costs of using in-house versus temporary agency
staff in high-skilled occupations supports these assertions. Table 2 shows the average total cost of fulltime, in-house staff and the bill rate charged by temporary help agencies, by occupation, for five of the
hospitals in our study. In all cases where hospitals used temporary help agencies to fill RN or other
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highly skilled clinical positions, the hourly bill rate for the temporary agency workers exceeded the
average total hourly cost of full-time workers. In most cases the bill rate was substantially higher.
So why did hospitals use temporary agency rather than in-house staff if temporary agency
workers were possibly less productive and cost more? The answer given by the hospitals was a
national “labor shortage” in nursing and some non-nursing professional occupations. Most hospitals
indicated that they tried or were trying to build up their in-house on-call pools and were trying to recruit
permanent staff. However, they were unable to recruit sufficient on-call and permanent full-time
employees to meet their staffing needs, by implication, at the wages they were offering.
How were temporary help agencies able to recruit employees when the hospitals could not?
Evidence from our interviews with hospital and temporary agency administrators and nurses in both
Michigan and North Carolina suggests that temporary help agencies recruited nurses and other hospital
professionals, quite simply, by paying them more than hospitals did. In the words of a hospital
administrator in Michigan, “One reason why temp agencies are able to get nurses and we’re not is that
they are paying them outrageous dollars that we won’t pay.”
That the hourly wage of temporary agency nurses and other temporary health care
professionals was higher than that of hospital employees seemed to be a fact well-known to hospital
administrators and employees. Traveler nurses and other health care professionals who were placed by
a national agency in a hospital for relatively long periods of time earned particularly high salaries. One
North Carolina hospital was using traveler temporary help agencies to fill two out of four radiation
therapist positions; in one case the traveler had been with the hospital almost a year. When asked why
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the temporary agency could attract employees when her hospital could not, a supervisor from this
hospital replied,
The temp agencies are paying them money, they are paying for their rent, they are paying
their food, they’re paying their car, they’re paying their travel. They earn a lot more . . .
and I can’t compete with that. The gentleman who has been with us for 11 months now,
I tried to offer him a position 9 months ago and I could not compete.
Other hospital administrators also noted the extremely high costs associated with traveler nurses and the
fact that these individuals, while highly trained, were earning substantially more than in-house staff.
It appears that even some local agencies, which tend to supply less highly specialized health
care professionals than do the traveler agencies, paid wages that exceeded the value of wages and
benefits received by hospital personnel in comparable positions. One local temporary help agency in
Michigan reported paying $29 to $30 per hour to its RNs, which compared to about $17 per hour that
the typical RN received in the hospitals the agency serviced. Even though the temporary agency did
not pay benefits to its nurses, the huge wage premium—on the order of 70 percent—exceeded the
value of benefits a worker would have received from a hospital. When asked why the temporary
agency paid such huge wage differentials, the manager at the temporary agency replied,
Because that’s what the market bears. It’s very simple. If you look in the paper and
read the ads [from other temporary agencies], they are just one after the other, $2,000
bonus, $30 an hour. I mean, we just couldn’t recruit if we didn’t pay that.
She also insisted that temporary help agencies had been paying their nurses large premiums over what
hospitals paid for years. According to this same temporary agency manager, the temporary agencies
attracted many nurses who had benefits from other sources and thus did not need benefits from their
employer. Thus, even if the wage premium paid by the temporary agency does not exceed the value of
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the benefits offered by hospitals, it is likely to be an attractive employer to those who place a low value
on company-provided benefits.17
Of course, the higher cost of the temporary agency nurse is passed on to the hospital through
the agency’s bill rate. Does a strategy of hiring temporary agency workers at such high cost make
sense? In the case of nurses and other professional hospital staff, the use of temporary help agencies
effectively becomes a vehicle for hospitals to pay higher wages to quickly fill vacancies without raising
the compensation of existing workers. Moreover, hospitals continue to try to hire permanent and inhouse on-call staff, thereby using agency temporaries to buy time to recruit employees at the hospital’s
lower wage levels.18 All other things equal, such wage discrimination likely lowers an organization’s
overall labor costs.19
Could hospitals practice such discrimination themselves without going through an intermediary?
Our evidence suggests that temporary help agencies attract many workers who place a high value on
wages relative to benefits. ERISA and nondiscrimination clauses in the IRS tax code would likely make
it legally difficult for hospitals to exclude certain groups from benefits. Moreover, as argued above,
while hospitals legally could offer new permanent employees or direct-hire temporaries higher wages
than existing employees, the adverse impacts of such a wage policy on employee morale and
productivity would likely cancel out any savings on hourly wage costs.
17

Supporting this argument, Bellemore (1998) presents evidence that temporary agency nurses value certain
benefits less than regular nurses.
18

Certainly, temporary agency and in-house staff positions are not homogeneous, with the latter offering
more regular employment, and possibly, in the case of regular workers, better benefits. Job matching models, cited
above, would predict that the amount of time it takes for a hospital to fill a job vacancy would be inversely related to
the wage level and the size of the wage gap between in-house and temporary agency positions.
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Formally, from equation (1) above, the marginal cost of a new hire is wt with wage discrimination, which is

 δw   δµ 

 Lt without wage discrimination.
 δµ   δt 

less than wt + 
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Do hospitals avoid this adverse effect on morale by hiring through a third party? Our evidence
on this issue from interviews with hospital administrators, nurses, and temporary agency managers is
mixed. For instance, one hospital in North Carolina experienced serious morale problems among its
nursing staff as a result of the wage differentials. In response to a question about whether the wage
differential between temporary and regular nurses causes problems, an administrator in this hospital
replied,
Yes, big time. It becomes a real irritant—a tremendous irritant for our nurses. They’re
saying, ‘Pay us the money, you are paying all this money out to a traveler, why aren’t
you paying us and giving us retention bonuses and getting us to stay? … And if the
hospital can find money for travelers, they could find money for me.’
In other hospitals, resentment among regular nurses over the higher wages that temporaries
made was mitigated by the fact that temporary nurses eased pressures on them to work overtime and
unpopular shifts. As expressed by a hospital administrator in Michigan,
You know, there’s always resentment when people are working side by side with someone
they know is making more money than them for the same job. But by the same token, if
the temps weren’t here, their vacations would be canceled … they are doing the job that
you didn’t want to do. Remember, you could have had these hours and you didn’t want
them, because they are always offered to the staff first. If you continue to do that kind of
education, then I think there is less resentment…
An administrator in another North Carolina hospital reported few morale problems in using
temporary nurses, in part because the regular nurses were “thrilled to have the help.” This administrator
also suggested that regular nurses might not be fully informed about the wage differentials: “I don’t
know if they [temp nurses] are trained or what, but they’ve got enough sense not to sit around and brag
about how much money they make.” In interviews with other hospitals, we found that although
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hospital administrators and regular nurses generally knew that temporary nurses earned more money
than regular staff, they often were uncertain as to how much more.
Thus, while hospitals cannot fully avoid morale problems associated with wage differentials,
using a third-party intermediary to pay higher wages to new workers likely mitigates the problem.
Regular staff may not blame the hospital for the wage differential, since the hospital does not directly
determine the wages of temporaries. Moreover, regular staff members are likely to be less informed
about the wages of temporaries than they are about other employees, and hence not focus on this issue.
In summary, we must emphasize that in no case did hospital administrators actually say that they
used temporary agencies to avoid raising wages of regular staff. Instead, what they said was that they
could not fill vacancies fast enough and that they “had” to use temporary staff to fill in while they tried to
recruit permanent employees or on-call staff. Their alternative was to raise wages to attract nurses and
other professional staff more quickly, an alternative that hospital administrators generally did not view as
viable, perhaps given the pressures they faced from HMOs and Medicare reform to lower costs.
Given that hospital administrators tended to view the wages they offered nurses and other professional
staff as relatively fixed, they indeed were constrained in their ability to hire new staff. They were able to
relieve these constraints by using temporary staff, whose wages were more responsive to market
forces. What we argue is that by using temporary agencies to fill nursing and other skilled positions,
hospitals were effectively introducing a two-tiered compensation system; from theory developed above,
this was likely a cost-effective strategy.
This finding from our case studies in hospitals is consistent with evidence of wage differentials
between temporary agency and regular nurses reported in Bellemore (1998). It also offers one
24

explanation for recent stagnant wage growth in nursing. Both nominal and real wages of RNs rose
slowly in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. From the National Sample Survey of Registered Nurses,
average nominal earnings of full-time registered nurses rose at a rate of 6.5 percent from 1980 to 1992,
while they rose at a rate of just 2.7 percent from 1992 to 2000. Moreover, while real earnings for fulltime RNs increased at a rate of 2.4 percent from 1980 to 1992, they rose at a rate of just 0.1 percent
from 1992 to 2000. Wage growth was especially low among hospital RNs, and this low wage growth
cannot be attributed to changes in skill mix (Schumacher 2001). The stagnant real wage growth for
RNs during the 1990s is particularly surprising given reports of a severe shortage of RNs in many areas
of the country. Our case study evidence suggests that use of temporary agency nurses during the
1990s is one explanation for the stagnant real wage growth. Although temporary agency RNs in the
hospitals we studied comprised a small share of the RN workforce, they arguably had an important
effect on wage growth by relieving pressures on these hospitals to raise wages for their employees.20
Why Hospitals Use Temporary Help Agencies in Low-Skilled Occupations
Besides nurses and medical specialists, the hospitals in our study made extensive use of agency
temporaries in medical assistant and clerical positions and sometimes in food service and housekeeping
positions (Table 1). Hospitals reported hiring agency temporaries in low-skilled positions both to meet
temporary staffing needs and to fill vacancies while they recruited permanent hires. With respect to the
first, a hospital’s need for patient sitters, who watch extremely ill or confused patients, is unpredictable
and varies from day to day. The hospitals in our study all staffed patient sitters entirely through
20

Schumacher (2001) suggests the growth of HMOs played some role in the low wage growth among RNs .
By imposing greater cost constraints on hospitals, HMOs may have contributed to the lower wage growth and the
development of shortages among high-skilled hospital staff, spurring the use of agency temporaries.
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temporary agencies. Similarly, two of the three hospitals reporting agency help in clerical positions
were staffing one-time special projects. It was unclear from our interviews why hospitals chose to use
temporary agencies in these positions in lieu of forming their own on-call pools or hiring temporary
workers directly. However, hospitals reported difficulty maintaining on-call pools for nurses in the
economic environment prevailing at the time, and it is likely that they would have had more difficulty
than temporary help agencies–which pool jobs across companies and enjoy scale economies in
recruiting and screening–in attracting a temporary workforce.
As with nurses and other high-skilled clinical staff, managers also used agency temporaries to fill
vacancies in low-skilled jobs while they tried to recruit permanent staff. As hospitals came under
intense pressure to reduce costs, wages in these low-skilled positions became uncompetitive with
wages for low-skilled workers in competing sectors. In the words of one manager, “We had a problem
attracting recruits. Frankly, McDonald’s and Burger King were paying what we were and [workers
there] don’t have to go through the stress or the hassle or the hours or the customer service that they
are required to perform here.” The utilization of agency temporaries became a way of quickly staffing
positions while managers continued to try to recruit permanent workers at relatively low wages.
How were temporary help agencies able to recruit workers in low-skilled functions when the
hospitals could not? In a few cases, hospital managers or temporary agencies reported that, as with
agency nurses, temporaries in low-skilled positions received higher wages than permanent staff in
comparable positions. More typically, however, temporary staff in low-skilled positions reportedly
earned about the same hourly wage as entry-level regular staff. Because regular staff usually received
some fringe benefits, while agency temporaries did not, total compensation of agency temporaries
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would be lower in cases where hourly wages were the same. Although temporary agencies may have
been better able than hospitals to recruit labor at any given wage rate, universal complaints from
hospital managers about agency referrals in certain low-skilled occupations suggests that for any given
wage rate, agency temporaries were, on average, of lower quality than regular staff. 21
The data we collected on the relative costs of regular workers and agency temporaries in
hospitals are generally consistent with information reported in interviews. Comparison of the total
hourly cost of full-time workers and the hourly billed rate for temporary workers is quite different for
low-skilled workers than for RNs and other high-skilled clinical workers (Table 2). Although the billed
hourly rate for agency temporaries was generally higher than the total hourly cost of regular workers in
low-skilled clinical positions, the differential was considerably less than that found in high-skilled clinical
positions.22 Moreover, the billed hourly rate for agency workers in clerical, food service, and
housekeeping positions was generally lower than the total hourly cost of regular full-time workers in
these positions. Data for this last set of occupations, in particular, are consistent with the hypothesis
that temporary help agencies effectively expanded the supply of workers for low-skilled positions by
lowering the cost to clients of utilizing lower quality or more risky workers.
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There were limits, however, to agencies’ ability to attract low-skilled workers at very low wage levels. One
hospital reported that both it and local temporary help agencies were unable to recruit any housekeepers at the
hospital’s desired wage: $7 per hour. In this case the hospital offered a wage below the going rate for the lowest
skilled, riskiest workers.
22

The higher cost of agency temporaries relative to in-house staff in low-skilled clinical positions in three
of the hospitals may be related to the heavy use of patient sitters, who have no counterparts in hospitals. Although
these positions require little in the way of hard skills, patient sitters work with the most vulnerable population in the
hospital and so require especially careful screening. Our data do not reveal whether the relatively high cost of
agency temporaries in these positions reflected workers’ wages workers or agency overhead.
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AUTO SUPPLIERS’ USE OF AGENCY TEMPORARIES IN TIGHT LABOR MARKETS
Like hospitals, auto suppliers have faced considerable pressure to lower labor costs. Although
the auto industry experienced record sales in the late 1990s and 2000, these volumes were reached
with generous incentive packages that depressed profits. To increase revenues, auto assemblers
pressed their suppliers to lower their costs. At the same time that they were under pressure to reduce
costs, first-tier auto suppliers faced tight labor markets and had difficulty recruiting and retaining
workers. Based on our case study evidence, we argue that auto suppliers used agency temporaries to
help lower labor costs and to screen workers for permanent jobs.
Table 3 summarizes some of the characteristics of the auto supply plants in our study and the
extent to which temporary agency workers were used in production. Two of the plants were unionized.
In one of the these, the union contract prohibited the use of temporary agency workers, while in the
other, the union contract strictly limited their use. Temporary agency workers were used regularly in
production in the three nonunion plants. In two of these plants, agency temporaries comprised over 20
percent of production employment at the time of our interviews.
Most of the entry-level production positions in these plants were low to semiskilled, requiring
one to three days of informal on-the-job training. At the time of our interviews, production workers
had been working long hours for the past several years, and the plants had been producing at or above
their designed plant capacity. The unionized plants had exhausted their “call back” lists of laid-off union
workers. Turnover and absentee rates had been on the rise. All of the human resources directors
reported difficulty recruiting and retaining good workers in the strong economic environment.
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The human resources directors and plant managers we interviewed listed several situations in
which they used temporary agency workers. The two most common were to accommodate temporary
increases in workload and to screen workers for permanent positions. One company also used
temporary workers to buffer regular workers in the event of a recession.
Buffering Core Workers
Reflecting the labor practices of its foreign, parent company, Company C was strongly
committed to not laying off any permanent employees. According to the human resources director at
this plant, this was the original rationale for using agency temporaries. They believed that they needed
to maintain about 10 percent of the production workforce in temporary positions to avoid laying off
employees in an economic downturn. At the time of our interviews, the fraction of their production
workforce coming from temporary help agencies was more than double their 10 percent target,
indicating that other factors were also important in determining their use of agency help.
Accommodating Increases in Workload
Three of the companies used agency temporaries to meet sudden increases in production (A, B,
and E, Table 3). Why did these companies choose to use agency temporaries rather than hire
temporary workers directly, as was done by the unionized plant whose union contract prohibited the
use of agency temporaries under any circumstances? In fact, traditionally these companies had hired
on-call workers to meet such short-term needs. However, given the extremely tight labor markets and
the fact that everyone on their call-back lists desiring employment had long since found it, human
resources directors had substituted agency temporaries for on-call workers.
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Above, we outlined several reasons why companies might find it more attractive to use agency
temporaries in lieu of direct-hire temporaries in tight labor markets. Because agencies pool job orders
across firms, they may offer more steady employment or better match the hours a worker desires than a
single firm could offer to workers in an in-house on-call pool. This gives temporary agencies a
comparative advantage in recruiting workers for temporary assignments, especially in tight labor
markets. In addition, when labor markets are slack, companies simply call workers off a layoff list.
When labor markets are tight, companies need to spend resources recruiting and screening workers,
and temp agencies, which enjoy economies-of-scale, may be able recruit and screen more quickly and
cheaply. Along these lines, some companies in our study felt that given tight labor markets and the size
of their human resources departments, they would be unable to recruit and screen workers quickly
enough to meet sudden, large production increases.23 Finally, in tight labor markets, companies are
under pressure to raise wages to attract temporary as well as permanent new hires. As argued below,
the use of agency temporaries relieved pressure on companies to raise wages by facilitating the use of
riskier workers.
Screening Workers for Permanent Positions
In all the firms we interviewed, agency temporaries assigned to limited production runs could
apply for permanent positions on other production lines when their temporary assignments were
complete. Moreover, all of the nonunion auto plants in our study explicitly used temporary agencies to
screen workers for permanent positions. In two of these plants (B and C), new production workers
23

As with hospitals, however, there was no correlation between agency use and establishment size, as
would be predicted by an economies-of-scale argument. The absence of such a correlation in such a relatively small
and homogenous sample does not necessarily imply economies-of-scale are unimportant, however.
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were being recruited exclusively through temporary help agencies. The other plant, A, recruited
through a combination of direct hires and temporary agencies. Specifically, this company hired
applicants with good work histories in manufacturing directly; more “risky” applicants were told they
must go through a temporary agency to gain employment at the plant.
There was wide variation across plants in the length of time it took for a temporary worker to
be hired as a permanent employee. In the union plant, temporary agency workers had to be either
dismissed or hired on a permanent basis after 30 days. At the other extreme, it was common for
agency temporaries to wait for a year before being offered a permanent job at Company C.
Production supervisors spoke in unison regarding the benefits of screening potential workers
through temporary employment agencies to lower their hiring risks. In tight labor conditions, many
entry-level workers have criminal records, a spotty work history, and little or no experience in a
manufacturing setting. In addition, the work activity at several of these facilities required teamwork and
good communication skills. It was important for production supervisors to select workers that could
“fit” into their production teams. As put by one supervisor,
I have the opportunity to observe this person over a period of time. I don’t have just a
half-hour snapshot to go by as in an interview. I can get to know the person, get to know
their background a little bit, get to know what their behaviors are, what motivates them,
what possible problem areas I might have with the individual.
The key question is why did these companies prefer to screen workers at an arm’s length,
through a temporary help agency, rather than hire workers directly for a probationary period, as had
been done traditionally? We explored this issue in detail in our interviews. One hypothesis is that
companies believe that they are less likely to be sued by dismissed workers if the workers are the
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employees of a temporary help agency (Autor 2003). None of the managers interviewed in our case
studies, however, felt that concern over lawsuits affected their companies’ decisions to use temporary
agency workers.
Another hypothesis is that managers find it difficult to fire workers on probation. By using
temporary agencies, managers may pass the unpleasant task of firing workers who display poor or
mediocre performance on to the temporary help agency or, at the end of a temporary worker’s
contract, choose not to hire that worker on a permanent basis. One manager interviewed in our study
indicated that this was a substantial advantage of screening workers through temporary help agencies:
There’s a benefit [in using temp agency or contract workers] in the fact that it’s a little bit
easier to dismiss a contract employee … For whatever reason they’re not working out, the
fit’s not right, they’re not making number, or their attendance is poor, I can call [the agency
representative] and say, ‘End their assignment.’ You can give them reasons why, you
don’t really have to give them reasons why … I mean, people in general, they hate to end
people’s jobs. I mean, that’s not a pleasant thing to do … [For workers hired directly on
probation] you can still end their employment, but it’s not a very frequent thing that
happens … it’s like, okay, now I have to face the person and say you didn’t work out.
In this more subtle way, the use of agency temporaries may lower the costs of firing workers and result
in a more productive workforce.
A third hypothesis for why companies screen through temporary help agencies is to lower the
wages of workers during their probationary period. As outlined above, in tight labor markets
companies have more difficulty recruiting qualified workers at any given wage rate. Companies could
attract more qualified applicants by raising their wage rates, but would likely need to raise the wage for
existing as well as new workers.24Alternatively, they could lower their standards and hire less qualified
24

Indeed, one auto supplier reported briefly adopting this strategy of raising wages and trying to recruit
experienced workers away from other employers, but abandoned it in favor of using agency temporaries.
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workers, offering them lower wages and fewer benefits. However, companies may be constrained in
lowering compensation by internal wage scales or benefits regulations.
The cost data we collected from the auto suppliers are consistent with the hypothesis that
companies screen new hires through agencies in part to lower wage costs during the probationary
period. Table 4 reports data on the hourly wage made by temporaries, the billed hourly rate charged
by the temporary help agency, the starting wage offered to permanent workers, and the total hourly
wage cost for permanent workers, as available, in the five plants studied. Although the hourly wage of
temporary agency and regular workers was the same, by contract, in the union plant, the hourly wage
of temporary workers was lower than the starting wage of permanent workers in all of the nonunion
plants.
Moreover, for all four of the plants using agency temporaries, the temporary agency bill rate
was lower than the total hourly cost of a permanent hire.25 Three of the four companies using agency
temporaries specifically acknowledged the cost savings in the interviews. In Company C, the cost
savings were particularly striking. According to the company’s accounting department, a fivepercentage-point reduction in the share of temporary agency workers would increase labor costs by $1
million over the course of a year. At the two unionized companies, the unions opposed the use of
agency temporaries on the grounds that the company would circumvent union wages and benefits by
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We compare the agency bill rate with the total hourly labor cost, including benefits, of regular workers.
Workers hired directly by the company typically did not receive benefits provided voluntarily by companies (e.g.,
health insurance, pension, life insurance) during their probationary period. Counting only mandatory benefit costs
(e.g., social security contributions, unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation), the hourly wage cost of new
hires was still greater than the hourly bill rate of temporaries for the three nonunion companies. Moreover, when
temporaries were hired, they were put on probation. Thus, hiring workers through a temporary agency became a way
of extending the period without these benefits.
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using cheaper temporary help. The numbers from our case studies support this concern. Human
resources directors at both unionized companies indicated that they would like to use or increase their
use of agency temporaries, but were constrained by their union contract.
In sum, the use of temporary help agencies in low-skilled auto supply positions–as in many lowskilled hospital functions–appeared to reduce pressures on companies to raise wages in tight labor
markets by lowering the cost of using more risky workers, thereby effectively expanding the supply of
potential labor to companies. This sharply contrasts with the situation for high-skilled clinical
occupations in hospitals, where agency temporaries earned considerably more than their hospital
counterparts and billed agency rates were substantially higher than the total hourly costs of in-house
staff. Thus, one consequence of using agency temporaries–reduced pressure to raise wages for existing
staff–was the same in both the high-skilled and low-skilled scenarios, but the path to this outcome was
quite different.
Morale and Productivity Issues
The fact that the hourly costs of agency temporaries in low-skilled production positions were
less than those of direct hires does not necessarily imply that it was cost-effective for companies to use
agency temporaries. Agency temporaries might have been less productive than those recruited directly
by the company if the temporary help agency attracted a lower quality worker than the company could
have itself attracted or if being a temporary worker lowered a worker’s morale, perhaps because of the
lower compensation.
However, the use of temporary agencies in auto supply did not seem to be a cause of the poor
quality of applicants, but rather a response to the shortage of qualified applicants at the wages
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companies were offering. For instance, Company A hired good applicants directly, but referred
applicants it considered high risk to the temporary agency, which then supplied these workers to the
company under contract. Managers at all of the auto suppliers expressed alarm at the decline in the
quality of the applicants for production jobs, and they attributed this problem to the tight labor market.
Concern that temporary workers were less committed to the organization and therefore were
less productive or more likely to quit than direct hires was limited at three of the four auto supply
companies using agency temporaries. At these companies, the wage differentials between regular and
temporary agency workers were considerably smaller and the duration of temporary employment much
shorter than at the other company, C.
Company C, a foreign-owned subsidiary with a strong no-layoff commitment to its regular
employees, paid high wages and benefits relative to its non-union competitors. With this strategy, it
hoped to attract the best employees and avoid unionization. Its original rationale for hiring temporary
workers was to buffer its regular employees in the event of a slowdown. However, the company
expanded dramatically during the 1990s and began using temporary agencies to rapidly fill vacancies.
Given that the hourly wage cost of agency temporaries was dramatically lower than that of regular
employees, company executives had been reluctant to reduce temporary agency employment. The
company hired exclusively through the agency, and temporaries had to wait six months to a year or
more before they knew whether or not they would be offered a permanent position. Through temporary
agencies, this company effectively lowered labor costs for new hires, thereby steepening the wage
tenure profile and capturing economic rents from workers.
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Focus groups with regular associates and agency temporaries at this plant revealed that the
temporaries felt the system, in which they were paid substantially lower wages for a long period of time
before being offered a permanent job, was unfair. However, this resentment did not appear to
adversely affect their productivity: they knew that they had to be extremely productive in order to gain
permanent employment at the facility. The one negative impact on productivity from the recruitment
policies at Company C came from high turnover. Many good workers grew tired of waiting for the
offer of permanent employment and quit. Whether the adverse productivity effects from this high
turnover outweighed the cost savings associated with lower wages was being debated internally at this
company at the time of our interviews.
CONCLUSION
The share of employment in temporary help agencies grew steadily during the expansion of the
1990s. A consistent and striking finding from our case studies was that employers increasingly turned
to temporary help agencies in tight labor markets largely because of difficulties in filling vacancies.
Hospitals used temporary help agencies to staff high-skilled as well as low-skilled jobs. Employers in
both sectors used temporary agencies to staff permanent as well as temporary positions.
We identify several potential advantages temporary agencies offer employers in recruiting
workers. Especially in tight labor markets, temporary agencies likely enjoy economies-of-scale in
recruiting and screening workers. By increasing the efficiency of job matches, temporary help agencies
may reduce pressure on companies to raise wages in tight labor markets, thereby resulting in lower
wage and higher employment growth.
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Additionally, we found evidence of substantial wage differentials between temp agency
workers, on the one hand, and direct-hire temporaries and direct-hire permanent recruits, on the other,
indicating other reasons why companies use agency temporaries in tight labor markets. In hospitals, our
evidence strongly suggests that temporary help agencies were able to recruit nurses and other
specialized clinical staff by paying them more than they would earn at the hospital. We argue that, by
using temporary agency help, hospitals were able to raise the wages of new entrants without raising the
wages of existing workers.
In contrast, we found little evidence of higher compensation among temporary workers
assigned to lower-skilled positions in hospitals and we documented substantially lower compensation
among temporary agency workers in production positions in auto supply companies. Rather than raising
wages and trying to attract workers with good employment histories away from other companies,
employers could use temporary help agencies to try out workers who, at least on average, were
deemed more risky. We argue that temporary help agencies facilitated employers’ use of riskier
workers by lowering their compensation and the costs of dismissing and replacing them. In turn,
temporary help agencies effectively expanded the supply of labor and mitigated the need for companies
to raise wages for new and existing workers. In such cases, lower aggregate wages are observed both
because risky workers with lower expected productivity and wages are utilized through temporary
agencies and because employers are able to avoid wage increases for their existing workforce.
These three cost-saving benefits that temporary agencies potentially offer employers in tight
labor markets–speedier job matching, wage discrimination in favor of new entrants, and lower costs of
hiring risky workers–all would be expected to lower wage growth and increase employment growth in
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the aggregate economy. Katz and Krueger (1999) describe their empirical result linking temporary
help employment to low wage growth as “speculative”. Through detailed case studies we are able to
better understand the mechanisms by which temporary help agencies may reduce pressure on
employers to raise wages in tight labor markets and conclude that such a linkage is, indeed, plausible.
In closing, whether one can generalize from the results of these case studies to the aggregate
economy is an open question. Nevertheless, the evidence from our case studies provides insights into
the potentially important role temporary help employment plays in tight labor markets that warrants
further study.
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Table 1 Use of Temporary Agency Help in Hospitals, by Occupation
Within
Occupations, %
hours worked
by temps

Distribution of temp Distribution of temp
agency hours
agency bill across
across occupations1
occupations2
(%)
(%)

Hospital Occupation
M1

M2

NC1

NC2 3

High-skilled clinical
RN
Pharmacists and related occupations
Physical therapists
Low-skilled clinical
Nursing & medical assistants
Clerical/Administrative
Unit administrative support
All Occupations
Food service
Housekeeping
Clerical/Administrative
Patient accounts
Admissions workers
Unit administrative support
All Occupations
High-skilled clinical
RN
Imaging tech
LPN
Low-skilled clinical
Nursing & medical assistants
Clerical/Administrative
Unit administrative support
All Occupations
High-skilled clinical
Certified RN anesthetist
RN
Imaging tech
Low-skilled clinical
Nursing & medical assistants
Clerical/Administrative
Unit administrative support
All Occupations

2
6
3

35
27
2
6

59
41
3
15

5

35

25

7
—

30
100

17
100

11
5
10
2
11
—

12
18
70
6
4
60
100

14
9
76
9
3
64
100

0.7
3
6

22
10
4
8

43
20
10
13

4

20

17

8
—

58
100

39
100

7

80
1
42
35
17
14

92
1
49
40
7
6

0.4
—

3
100

1
100

2
4
26
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Table 1 (Continued)

Within
Occupations, %
hours worked
by temps

Distribution of temp Distribution of temp
agency hours
agency bill across
across occupations1
occupations2
(%)
(%)

Hospital Occupation
NC3

High-skilled clinical
RN
Low-skilled clinical
Phlebotomists
Nursing & medical assistants
Clerical/Administrative
Unit administrative support
All Occupations

0.1

1

0.7
2

7
81
1
80

19
71
1
70

0.3
—

12
100

10
100

Figures in this column report the percent of total temp agency hours worked in a hospital accounted for by each
occupation.
2
Figures in this column report the percent of a hospital’s total temporary agency bill accounted for by each
occupation.
3
Occupations that account for less than 1 percent of the hospital’s expenditures on temporary agencies are not
listed separately but are included in hospital subtotals in columns 2 and 3.
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Table 2

Comparison of Hourly Cost of Full-Time Employees and Agency Temporaries in
Hospitals, by Occupation
Average total cost
full-time ($)

Bill rate agency
temporaries ($)

% difference,
agency temps v.
employees

27.51
26.51
25.56

34.25
27.40
53.77

24
3
110

13.23

15.50

17

14.34

12.92

–10

12.90
11.27

10.88
10.94

–16
–3

15.33
14.48
13.94

17.02
13.32
14.74

11
–8
6

24.25
22.32
16.67

34.12
36.05
28.15

41
62
69

12.16

14.86

22

13.29

11.48

–14

55.12
27.82
23.69

60.00
40.00
40.00

9
44
69

12.07

14.68

22

16.09

11.50

–29

Hospital Occupation
M1

High-skilled clinical
RN
Pharmacists and related occupations
Physical therapists
Low-skilled clinical
Nursing & medical assistants
Clerical/Administrative
Unit administrative support

M2

Food service
Housekeeping
Clerical/Administrative
Patient accounts
Admissions workers
Unit administrative support

NC1

NC2

High-skilled clinical
RN
Imaging tech
LPN
Low-skilled clinical
Nursing & medical assistants
Clerical/Administrative
Unit administrative support
1

High-skilled clinical
Certified RN anesthetist
RN
Imaging tech
Low-skilled clinical
Nursing & medical assistants
Clerical/Administrative
Unit administrative support

NC3

High-skilled clinical
RN
26.31
36.25
38
Low-skilled clinical
Phlebotomists
14.97
16.75
12
Nursing & medical assistants
13.58
12.25
–10
Clerical/Administrative
Unit administrative support
14.58
11.50
–21
1
Occupations that account for less than 1 percent of the hospital’s expenditures on temporary agencies are not
listed.
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Table 3

Use of Temporary Agency Employment among Auto Suppliers
Temporary employees

Company

1

Union

All
employees

Production
employees

Number

As percent of all
production
employment

Product

Organization type

A

Technically advanced interior
and exterior equipment

Locally owned

No

1,400

1,000

30-60

5–6

B

Chassis systems

European-owned
branch plant

No

750

450

125

28

C

Heat exchange
component parts

Japanese subsidiary

No

2,100

1,521

348

23–25

D

Drive shafts

Branch plant of large U.S.
owned company

Yes

900

550

0

0

E

Auto body components

Locally owned single
plant company

Yes

430

320

0-301

0–9

This plant had recently laid off all 30 of its temporary workers.

Table 4 Cost Comparisons of Permanent and Temporary Workers

Company

Hourly wage
temporaries ($)

Bill rate
temporaries ($)

Starting wage
employees ($)

Total hourly costs
employees ($)

% difference, hourly cost
agency temps v.
employees

A

7.90

10.90

10.60

13.78

!21

B

8.00

10.40

9.62

12.51

!17

C

7.50

10.88

13.28

18.22

!40

—

15.51

30.51

—

16.92

12.35

22.85

!26

D

—

E

12.35
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